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THE JOHN F. SONNETT
MEMORIAL LECTURE
A PILLAR OF DEMOCRACY:
REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE AND WORK OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
Kate O’Regan*
“The true administration of justice is the firmest pillar of good
government.”1

In his memorable judgment in the matter in which the Constitutional
Court declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional, S v. Makwanyane,2
former Chief Justice Ismail Mahomed spoke of the new South African
Constitution in the following terms:
All Constitutions seek to articulate, with differing degrees of intensity
and detail, the shared aspirations of a nation; the values which bind its
people, and which discipline its government and its national institutions;
the basic premises upon which judicial, legislative and executive power is
to be wielded; the constitutional limits and the conditions upon which that
power is to be exercised . . . and the moral and ethical direction which that
nation has identified for its future. In some countries the Constitution
only formalises, in a legal instrument, a historical consensus of values and
aspirations evolved incrementally from a stable and unbroken past to
accommodate the needs of the future. The South African Constitution is
different: it retains from the past only what is defensible and represents a
decisive break from, and a ringing rejection of, that part of the past . . . .
The contrast between the past which it repudiates and the future to which
it seeks to commit the nation is stark and dramatic . . . . What the
Constitution expressly aspires to do is to provide a transition from the[]
grossly unacceptable features of the past to a conspicuously contrasting
future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and

* Judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa (1994–2009). This Essay is based on
remarks delivered on February 13, 2012, at the John F. Sonnett Memorial Lecture held at
Fordham University School of Law.
1. This quote is inscribed on the facade of the New York Supreme Court courthouse at
60 Centre Street.
2. 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
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peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South
Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.3

The powerful message of this passage is that the South African
Constitution is a transformative document which recognises that our society
needs to change in fundamental ways and which articulates the values that
are to guide the process of transformation. It is nearly eighteen years since
constitutional democracy dawned in South Africa. Eighteen years in which
constitutional democracy has been taking root and in which a strong form
of judicial review has been undertaken by the courts. My purpose this
evening is to describe to you the role of the courts, and particularly the
Constitutional Court, in this new constitutional order.
To me, the real strength of understanding other societies and their
constitutions (and indeed the South African Constitution permits courts
when interpreting its Bill of Rights to look at foreign law),4 is that it often
liberates one from the habits and assumptions of one’s own training and
experience. It can facilitate the identification of strengths and weaknesses
in one’s own system and enable one to see more clearly the structural
constraints that historical antecedents and present conditions impose. In so
doing, it allows us to imagine different ways of being both democratic and
respectful of human rights—the twin obligations of the modern state.
Before turning to the role of the Court, I am going briefly to describe
how our Constitution was drafted. Then, I will discuss the genesis of the
Court and how its members are appointed. And finally, I will describe the
role of the Court under the Constitution by illustrating two aspects of our
jurisprudence: how the Court deals with difference in our society; and how
it adjudicates social and economic rights—two of the most challenging
areas of constitutional jurisprudence, in our democracy, as well as in many
others.
I. THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
How was the South African Constitution drafted?5 The process which
culminated in our Constitution commenced in the 1990s with the release
from prison of the leaders of the liberation movements, the African
National Congress, and the Pan-Africanist Congress. Four years of intense
negotiations followed, which resulted initially in deadlock. The liberation
movements wanted a constitution drafted by a democratically elected
constituent assembly.
The National Party government wanted a
constitution drafted by negotiation prior to the first elections. Finally, it
was agreed that a two-stage process to constitutional and political reform
would be followed. A temporary or interim constitution was negotiated and
3. Id. at 487–88 para. 262 (internal quotation marks omitted).
4. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 39(1)(c).
5. Some of this section of the speech draws on a speech I delivered at Trinity College
Dublin in April 2000 and since published as Cultivating a Constitution: Challenges Facing
the Constitutional Court in South Africa, 22 DUBLIN U. L.J. 1, 3–7 (2000).
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enacted by the minority government. In terms of the interim constitution,
elections would be held to elect a new Parliament.
The newly elected Parliament would have two roles: the first was as
national legislature; and the second was as a Constitutional Assembly
responsible for drafting a new constitution. The fears of the National Party
were met, however, by an agreement that the new constitution would
comply with certain constitutional principles agreed before 1994 and
annexed as a schedule to the interim constitution. It was agreed that a new
Constitutional Court would be established which would have the duty of
determining whether the new constitution adopted by the Constitutional
Assembly complied with the thirty-four constitutional principles set out in
the interim Constitution. This compromise was the genesis of the
Constitutional Court: it was to be established to decide if the new
constitution was indeed constitutional!
The constitution-making process involved a high degree of public
participation. Right from the start, key figures in the process identified the
need to involve members of the public. Cyril Ramaphosa, speaking on 24
January, shortly after the Assembly was convened, stated:
It is therefore important that as we put our vision to the country, we
should do so directly, knowing that people out there want to be part
of the process and will be responding, because in the end the
drafting of the constitution must not be the preserve of the 490
members of this Assembly. It must be a constitution which they
feel they own, a constitution that they know and feel belongs to
them. We must therefore draft a constitution that will be fully
legitimate, a constitution that will represent the aspirations of our
people.6
Ramaphosa was right. If, as Ismail Mahomed says, a constitution is not
merely a legal document but is a charter which identifies the shared
aspirations of a nation and its common values,7 a process of public
participation is essential.
Consulting the public in any society is never an easy task. In South
Africa, a society (at the time) of more than 40 million people, many of
whom live in poverty in rural areas, many of whom are not fully literate,
and many of whom have only irregular access to print or electronic media,
it is daunting indeed.8 The approach adopted by the Constitutional
Assembly was multifaceted. Advertisements were placed in the print and
broadcast media calling for submissions to the Constitutional Assembly. In
excess of 1.7 million submissions were received, the bulk of which were
petitions on discrete issues. In addition, a series of public meetings were
held throughout the Republic: attended by more than 20,000 people and

6. HASSEN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A NATION:
AFRICA 239 (1998).
7. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA at 487–88 para. 262.
8. See EBRAHIM, supra note 6, at 241.
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717 organisations.9 Of these meetings, Hassen Ebrahim, the executive
Director of the Constitutional Assembly said:
The public meetings held were extremely successful: discussions were
lively, ideas original, and the exchange of views appreciated. These
meetings also served to highlight the point that constitutions are about
basic values affecting society and should be understood by even the least
educated. It was a humbling experience to realize that constitutional
debates and issues are not only the domain of the intellectual elite, but
that they belong to everyone.10

In addition, there were television and radio programmes broadcast to air
the key issues under negotiation. By and large, these programmes were
structured as discussions between members of the Constitutional Assembly
and members of civil society on issues under consideration in the Assembly
such as the Bill of Rights, the separation of powers, the national anthem and
flag, traditional leaders, and the death penalty.
A website was also created which contained a database of all the
information produced by the Constitutional Assembly, including minutes,
drafts, opinions, and submissions. It was early days for the internet,
especially in South Africa, but the site was very popular. The material on
the site is currently being recaptured and indexed and it is hoped that it will
soon
be
available
on
the
Constitutional
Court
website,
www.constitutionalcourt.org.za.
How successful was the process of public participation? That is difficult
to evaluate. Its purpose was clearly twofold: a substantive one to allow
members of the public to affect the actual provisions of the Constitution
itself; and a process-based one, rooted in a conception of democracy which
is participative rather than merely representative. No work has been done,
as far as I am aware, on the extent to which the process of public
participation affected the actual text of the Constitution and I cannot
helpfully speculate on it. Perhaps there is an interesting doctoral thesis to
be written there.
And what of the process purpose of public participation? Independent
market research at the time revealed that the campaign for public
participation reached as many as 65 percent of South Africans.11 The same
research makes it clear that many members of the public were sceptical
about the call for public participation.12 Yet the sheer number of
submissions received and the extent of participation in public meetings
suggested that there was great interest and significant involvement in the
process.
It is perhaps worth noting here that negotiated change has had to take
place in many walks of South African life. Local government, for example,

9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 244.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 243.
See id. at 239–50.
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had been racially divided under apartheid, with each town having separate
municipal councils based on race. In each municipal area, negotiations had
to take place to arrange for the manner in which the separate councils would
merge. Similarly, many public organisations, from school boards to
sporting codes have had to renegotiate their ground rules of their
organisations. These processes were often conflictual at first, but by and
large, through compromise and negotiation, solutions to apparently
intractable problems were reached.
Not surprisingly, then, inclusive processes that emphasise participation
have become important values of our new constitutional democracy. They
are widely accepted ground rules in many walks of South African life. And
I think there can be no doubt that the public participation process around the
Constitution contributed to this.
The importance of participation in law-making processes is also given
expression in a wide variety of constitutional provisions. For example, the
new Constitution requires both houses of Parliament to “facilitate public
involvement” in their legislative and other processes.13 The Constitutional
Court has had to interpret these provisions on several occasions. Relying
extensively on international law, the Court has held, by majority, that the
provisions require Parliament to act reasonably to facilitate public
involvement in law-making. If Parliament unreasonably fails to facilitate
public involvement, the consequence may be that the legislation enacted
will be invalid, though any order of invalidity will ordinarily be suspended
to enable Parliament to adopt a reasonable process to facilitate public
involvement. The Court was clear that Parliament’s view of what would
constitute reasonable facilitation of public involvement would be respected
by the courts.14 As former Chief Justice Ngcobo said in his judgment:
[T]he duty to facilitate public involvement must be construed in the
context of our constitutional democracy, which embraces the principle of
participation and consultation. Parliament and the provincial legislatures
have broad discretion to determine how best to fulfil their constitutional
obligation to facilitate public involvement in a given case, so long as they
act reasonably. Undoubtedly, this obligation may be fulfilled in different
ways and is open to innovation on the part of the legislatures. In the end,
however, the duty to facilitate public involvement will often require
Parliament and the provincial legislatures to provide citizens with a
meaningful opportunity to be heard in the making of the laws that will
govern them. Our Constitution demands no less.15

13. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 §§ 59(1)(a), 72(1)(a).
14. See Doctors for Life Int’l v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) at
467 para. 124; see also Matatiele Municipality v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. (2)
2007 (6) SA 477 (CC) at 491–94 paras. 50–55.
15. Doctors for Life 2006 (6) SA at 474 para. 145.
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II. THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: FOSTERING A
DEMOCRACY BASED ON PUBLIC REASON
The Constitutional Court is the final court of appeal in constitutional
matters. Although somewhat resistant to precise definition, a constitutional
matter is a matter that involves the interpretation or enforcement of a
provision of the Constitution. Given the scope of the Bill of Rights in our
Constitution, the range of constitutional matters is far broader than it would
be were the Bill of Rights to be less expansive.
Right at the beginning, the Constitution declares that the “Constitution is
the supreme law of the Republic” and “law or conduct inconsistent with it is
invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.”16 The
corollary of this is that a court, “when deciding a constitutional matter
within its power” must declare law or conduct that is inconsistent with the
Constitution to be invalid to the extent of its inconsistency.17 The
Constitution then provides that the Court may make any “just and
equitable” order.18 Such an order may suspend the order of invalidity for
any period and on any conditions in order to allow the competent authority,
which may be Parliament, a provincial legislature, or an administrator, the
opportunity to correct the defect. The court may also limit the retrospective
effect of the order of invalidity.
The special role of the Constitutional Court is recognised by a rule that
an order of constitutional invalidity in respect of an Act of Parliament,
provincial legislation, or conduct of the President will have no force unless
it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court.19 Between five and ten cases
are confirmed by the Court each year through this procedure.
A. The Appointment of Judges
The eleven judges of the Constitutional Court thus play an important and
powerful role under our constitutional order. Not surprisingly, then, the
procedure for appointment of judges under our Constitution also marks a
distinct change from the past when judges were appointed by the member
of Cabinet responsible for the administration of justice (the Minister of
Justice). In 1994, for the first time, a Judicial Service Commission was
established to participate in the process of the selection of judges.20 Its first
task was to assist in the appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court.
Under the terms of the 1996 Constitution, the Commission has twentythree members21: the Chief Justice, who presides; the President of the
Supreme Court of Appeal; the Minister of Justice; one Judge President (that
is a judge who presides over one of the High Courts); four practising
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 2.
Id. § 172(1)(a).
Id. § 172(1)(b).
Id. § 172(2)(a).
Id. § 178(1); see Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994 (S. Afr.).
S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 178.
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lawyers; a professor of law; four presidential nominees; and ten members of
Parliament (comprising four representatives from the National Council of
Provinces (the upper house) and six representatives from the National
Assembly—of these six, at least three must be members of the Opposition
in Parliament).22
High Court judges and judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal (formerly
the Appellate Division and the highest court of appeal in nonconstitutional
matters) are appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Service
Commission.23 In practice, this has meant when vacancies arise, the
Commission calls for nominations and then compiles a short list of
candidates for interview. Interviews are held in public, though they are not
televised. In the case of Constitutional Court judges, the transcripts of the
interviews of the successful candidates for the Constitutional Court are
available on the Court’s website. The Commission then sends to the
President the names it recommends for appointment. As far as I am aware,
the President has never rejected a name proposed by the Commission.
The Constitution itself expressly requires that a key factor for the
Commission to consider in appointing judges is “[t]he need for the judiciary
to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa.”24 In
1994, of 166 judges all but four were white men. Today the figure has
changed significantly. The composition of the Constitutional Court bench
in July 2011 was as follows: eight men (three White and five Black) and
two Black women. The current Chief Justice is Mogoeng Mogoeng; and
the Deputy Chief Justice is Dikgang Moseneke. Constitutional Court
judges serve a maximum period of fifteen years.25
Why should we be concerned about the demographics of the bench?
There is an extensive literature on why it is appropriate for a judiciary to be
diverse,26 but for me two reasons stand out. The first is that a diverse bench
22. Id.
23. See id. § 174(6).
24. Id. § 174(2).
25. See S. AFR. CONST., First Amendment Act of 2001.
26. See, e.g., Sean Cooney, Gender and Judicial Selection: Should There Be More
Women on the Courts?, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 20 (1993); Rachel Davis & George Williams,
Reform of the Judicial Appointments Process: Gender and the Bench of the High Court of
Australia, 27 MELB. U. L. REV. 819 (2003); Richard F. Devlin, We Can’t Go on Together
with Suspicious Minds: Judicial Bias and Racialized Perspective in R. v. R.D.S., 18
DALHOUSIE L.J. 408 (1995); Murray Gleeson, Judicial Selection and Training: Two Sides of
the One Coin, 77 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 591 (2003); Regina Graycar, The Gender of Judgments:
Some Reflections on “Bias,” 32 U. B.C. L. REV. 1 (1998); Brenda Hale, Equality and the
Judiciary: Why Should We Want More Women Judges?, 2001 PUB. L. 489; Claire
L’Heureux-Dubé, Making a Difference: The Pursuit of a Compassionate Justice, 31 U. B.C.
L. REV. 1 (1997); Errol P. Mendes, “Promoting Heterogeneity of the Judicial Mind”:
Minority and Gender Representation in the Canadian Judiciary, in ONT. LAW REFORM
COMM’N, APPOINTING JUDGES: PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND PRACTICE 91 (1991); Martha
Minow, Equalities, 88 J. PHIL. 663 (1991); Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or
Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1201 (1992); Jennifer Nedelsky, Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law, 42
MCGILL L.J. 91 (1997); Maryka Omatsu, The Fiction of Judicial Impartiality, 9 CAN. J.
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enhances the legitimacy of the judiciary in the eyes of the broader
community. It is important in a diverse society that the bench is not seen to
be the preserve of a particular group or elite, or this will damage the
institution. Within this reason, however, lurks a danger that can be
described as the siren of identity determinism. Your identity determines
your judgments. If you are a black male judge, you will sympathise with a
black male accused/complainant and your judgment will reflect this. The
notion extends further: if you are a black male judge, you have an
obligation to see the world in a particular way; and if you do not, you are to
be criticised for that. Such reasoning must be rejected vigorously.
This is not to say that, as human beings, judges are not products of the
societies within which they live; and that their race, gender, religion,
schooling, and a variety of other factors have affected their beliefs and
understanding of the world. But the task of judging in a democracy
demands more of judges than that they merely give effect to a world-view
inherited from their particular background. It demands a self-conscious
appreciation of the impact of their background on their way of thinking and
a conscientious attempt at all times to be impartial. In my view, the
obligation of impartiality leads directly to the second important reason that
our Constitution requires diversity on the bench.
In his direct and honest statement to the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, my former colleague Justice Ackermann remarked:
Judges who believe that they are wholly free of prejudice delude
themselves. It behoves us all to seek out rigorously, painful as that might
be, our own particular prejudices, of whatever nature. We need to keep
these constantly in mind and to endeavour actively and persistently to
counteract them. Furthermore, we all need to understand the insidious
influence of institutional culture and to appreciate the powerful effects of
the class, social and political environments in which we live and work,
and the potential that this has for making us insensitive to the context and
views of others.27

So requiring diversity on a collegial court enables judges to interrogate
their own prejudices or blind-spots. The more alike judges are, the more
likely that they will mistake prejudices for simple truths; the more different
they are, the more likely that they will interrogate the correctness of their
assumptions. If our backgrounds are the same, it is very comfortable and
easy to reinforce the prejudices that such backgrounds foster. When we are
different, prejudices masquerading as “common sense” or “the ways things
are” are much more likely to be uncovered. If judges are, as the South
African oath of office requires, to “administer justice to all persons alike
WOMEN & L. 1 (1997); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); Patricia M. Wald, Some Real-Life
Observations About Judging, 26 IND. L. REV. 173 (1992); Bertha Wilson, Will Women
Judges Really Make a Difference?, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 507 (1990).
27. L. W. H. Ackermann, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Re:
The Role of the Judiciary, 115 S. AFR. L.J. 15, 54 (1998).
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without fear, favour or prejudice,”28 we need to know where our prejudices
lie. To me, therefore, this is the second reason for diversity on the bench:
the fostering of judicial self-awareness is of great importance to me as a
judge. It is a constant reminder not to delude myself that I am by nature
impartial. Needless to say, it is a consideration which I like to draw to the
attention of my colleagues from time to time as well!
B. The Work of the Court
The Constitutional Court has handed down 422 judgments in its first
seventeen years of existence, a rate of just under twenty-five per year. This
is not a prodigious judicial output compared to other senior courts around
the world. But that relatively low output needs to be assessed in the light of
three considerations.
The first is that the Court has eleven members, and the general rule is that
all eleven judges sit in every case. Although there is no doubt that the size
of the Court is valuable in many respects, it probably slows down the
process of decision-making and writing. Just, for example, to go round the
table and permit every judge to air his or her views on a case will often take
an hour.
Secondly, the Court receives far more applications for access to the Court
than it actually enrols for hearing. Each of these applications, which in the
last four years that I was at the Court exceeded the number of cases heard
on a ratio of between three and four to one (that is, an additional seventyfive to one hundred cases per annum to those that are actually enrolled for
hearing) are considered by all the judges of the Court, unlike other senior
appellate courts which often delegate this decision making responsibility to
a few judges. As our Constitution stipulates that a quorum of the Court is
eight, no one can be turned away from the Court without at least eight
judges having considered the matter.29
Finally, the issues that have come before the court in its first seventeen
years have been some of the most difficult considered by courts anywhere.
Some have attracted much public comment, such as the constitutionality of
the death penalty, gay marriage, and some high profile criminal matters.
Other issues have required the Court to grapple with issues relating to the
interpretation and protection of social and economic rights—where there is
no tried and tested path—and questions of constitutional structure and
relationship that involve interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution
other than the Bill of Rights.
How often does the Court declare an Act of Parliament to be inconsistent
with the Constitution? According to my records, the Court has heard 147
such challenges and in ninety cases has upheld the challenge, an average of
just under six times a year. Interestingly, the average has not declined
markedly over the period. In the first five years, twenty-nine legislative
28. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 sched. 2, item 6.
29. Id. § 167(2).
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provisions were declared to be invalid. In the following five years, twentynine legislative provisions were declared invalid, and in the seven years
since, thirty-two provisions have been declared to be invalid.
It is important to realise that, in many cases, the declaration of invalidity
is not controversial. Indeed the rules of the Court provide that the relevant
government minister responsible for the legislation must be given notice of
the challenge and afforded an opportunity to oppose it. It is not infrequent
that the Minister appears only to indicate that the government does not
vigorously wish to argue that the legislation is constitutional, but only
wishes to make submissions as to the appropriate order to be made by the
Court to regulate the effect of the declaration of invalidity.
Sometimes, of course, the declaration of invalidity is controversial
particularly with the public. The leading example of this is the death
penalty case that I mentioned at the outset in which the legislative provision
which provided for capital punishment was declared to be inconsistent with
the Constitution and invalid. The Court directed all persons sentenced to
death would remain in custody until their sentences were substituted by
lawful punishments.30 Similarly controversial was the order in the case of
Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie31 which declared section 30(1) of the
Marriage Act 25 of 1961 to be inconsistent with the Constitution and
invalid because it “does not permit same-sex couples to enjoy the status and
the benefits coupled with responsibilities it accords to heterosexual
couples.”32
The model of judicial review adopted in the South African Constitution
gives considerable powers to courts to determine the constitutionality of
legislation, and once having done so, compels a court to declare legislation
inconsistent with the Constitution invalid. Yet there are other provisions in
the Constitution which make it plain that the Court must listen carefully to
the reasons given by the legislature and executive for enacting legislation
which limits rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights.
The model of rights adjudication is a two-stage model, perhaps most
closely aligned with (though by no means identical to) the Canadian
model.33 This means that a court when considering a constitutional
challenge to legislation asks two questions. The first is, does the legislation
limit a right entrenched in the Bill of Rights—this exercise is by no means
formal or automatic. The Court has adopted a careful approach to
delineating the scope of rights, and a litigant bears the burden of
establishing that his or her right is infringed by the legislation under attack.

30. S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 453 para. 151.
31. 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC).
32. Id. at 585.
33. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that the “rights
and freedoms set out . . . [in this Charter are] subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, pt. 1, § 1 (U.K.).
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Should the Court decide that the legislation does limit a right, the next
question that will arise is whether the limitation is “reasonable and
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom.”34 This affords the executive defending the
constitutionality of legislation an opportunity both to lead evidence and
present argument as to why the legislation is not unconstitutional.
How does the Court decide whether an infringement will nevertheless
pass the test of justification? It considers whether the reason given by the
government for limiting the right is sufficiently important to outweigh the
impact it causes in limiting the right. This is essentially a proportionality
analysis. The approach was summarised in an early decision of the Court
as follows:
In sum, therefore, the Court places the purpose, effect and importance of
the infringing legislation on one side of the scales and the nature and
effect of the infringement caused by the legislation on the other. The
more substantial the inroad into fundamental rights, the more persuasive
the grounds of justification must be.35

The process of limitations analysis therefore permits the Court to
consider the reasons proffered by government for the legislation under
attack. In so doing, it affords a government an opportunity to set out its
reasons for the limitation to persuade the Court, and the broader society, of
the legitimacy of both its purpose and method.
As we saw in relation to the legislature’s obligation to public
participation in the making of legislation, where the Court held that the
legislature must openly and reasonably determine the extent of public
participation it will facilitate in the making of any particular law, limitation
analysis requires the government to disclose its reasons for enacting
legislation which has infringed the Bill of Rights. The Court then assesses
whether those reasons are sufficient given the nature of the limitation of
rights concerned. In a real sense, the function of the Court here is twofold:
most obviously, it serves as the guardian of fundamental rights; less
obviously, but as importantly, it serves to create a forum for public debate
about the reasons for the exercise of power. This role carries with it a
conception of democracy which requires the exercise of public power to be
accountable. Again and again, our Constitution confers power upon courts
to enable citizens to hold public power accountable through requiring the
disclosure of reasons for the exercise of power in a public and open forum.
III. “SOUTH AFRICA BELONGS TO ALL WHO LIVE IN IT,
UNITED IN OUR DIVERSITY”
So proclaims the Preamble to our Constitution. What is the role of the
courts and the Bill of Rights in realising this goal? The challenge posed by
the principle arises in a variety of different arenas: traditional leaders and
34. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 36(1).
35. S v. Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) at 395 para. 18.
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customary law, religious and cultural practices, and the rights of
noncitizens. The Court has had cases in all these areas. Tonight I only
have time to discuss two. The first concerns customary law; and the second
cultural and religious practices in schools.
As a matter of social practice, traditional leaders still play an important
part in South African public life, particularly in the rural areas, and so does
customary law.
Our democratic Constitution recognises traditional
leadership and confirms that “[t]he institution, status and role of traditional
leadership, according to customary law, are recognised, subject to the
Constitution.”36 It also provides that “[t]he courts must apply customary
law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution.”37
The first important case where the Court has had to consider customary
law was the case of Mrs. Bhe.38 She came to court seeking relief on behalf
of her seven- and ten-year old daughters. The father of the children, Mr.
Maboyisi Mgolombane died intestate in October 2002. He had been a
carpenter and she a domestic worker and they lived together in an informal
home in the giant township of Khayelitsha just outside Cape Town. Upon
Mr. Mgolombane’s death, his father was declared sole heir in the deceased
estate according to the customary principle of male primogeniture, Mr.
Mgolombane having no surviving male children. The father intended to
sell the family home in order to cover funeral expenses which would have
left Mrs. Bhe and the two young girls homeless. With the assistance of a
local organisation, Mrs. Bhe launched a constitutional challenge to the
customary law rule of male primogeniture which reached the Constitutional
Court in 2004.
Speaking on behalf of the majority, Chief Justice Langa held that:
The exclusion of women from inheritance on the grounds of gender
is a clear violation of . . . the Constitution. It is a form of
discrimination that entrenches past patterns of disadvantage among
a vulnerable group, exacerbated by old notions of patriarchy and
male domination incompatible with the guarantee of equality under
this constitutional order.39
The Court thus declared that the rule of male primogeniture in customary
law was inconsistent with the Constitution to the extent that it excludes
women or extramarital children from inheriting property.
The message of the Bhe case, based on the express text of the
Constitution, is that customary law is to be recognised as an important
system of law in our society. Yet, like all laws in our legal system, it is
subject to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and, in this case, was held
to be inconsistent with the right to be free from unfair discrimination. This
is the first important principle of the Constitution’s protection of diversity
36.
37.
38.
39.

S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 211(1).
Id. § 211(3).
Bhe v. Magistrate 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC).
Id. at 621–22 para. 91.
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in our society: it embraces the pluralist character of our society but on
express terms. The fundamental rights entrenched in the Constitution may
not be impaired by any community or culture.
The second case that is illustrative of the approach to diversity in our
constitutional framework is the case of Sunali Pillay.40 Ms. Pillay was a
fifteen-year-old student at a public school for girls in Durban. The school
had a code of conduct which provided for a school uniform and which
prohibited the wearing of jewelry at school, save for ear-studs (at the same
level), watches, and medic-alert bracelets.
Ms. Pillay’s family came originally from southern India and some of the
women in her family had a tradition of wearing a nose stud, which is a
widespread cultural and religious practice in Hindu communities in
southern India. Contrary to the school rules, Ms. Pillay had her nose
pierced and started wearing a tiny nose stud to school. The school objected
but gave her three months’ grace to allow the piercing to settle and then told
her that she would have to remove the stud. When Ms. Pillay did not do so,
the school asked her and her mother to explain on what basis they sought an
exemption from the school’s uniform code. Her mother explained that:
It is a time-honoured family tradition. Sunali and I come from a South
Indian family that has sought to maintain a cultural identity by respecting
and implementing the traditions of the women before us. Usually, a
young woman would get her nose pierced upon her physical maturity (the
onset of her menstrual cycle) as an indication that she is now eligible for
marriage. While this physically oriented reasoning no longer applies, we
do still use the tradition to honour our daughters as responsible young
adults.41

After consulting experts on Hindu religion and culture, the school
decided that this reasoning did not warrant an exemption to be made and
proceeded with school disciplinary hearings against Ms. Pillay, who then
approached the Equality Court. The matter wound its way through the
court system to the Constitutional Court, which by a majority upheld Ms.
Pillay’s claim. In the end result, although the Court was divided on the
precise order, the principle that underlay both judgments was the principle
that, under our Constitution, diversity must not only be tolerated but
fostered.
IV. A SOUTH AFRICAN SPECIALITY: SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS
Time does not permit a full consideration of this aspect of the Court’s
jurisprudence, but I shall describe it briefly.
Rights that are protected are the right of access to adequate housing,42 to
a basic education,43 the right of access to health care services, sufficient
40. MEC for Educ. v. Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC), CCT 51/06 (Oct. 5, 2007). This is
an as yet unreported judgment of the Constitutional Court.
41. Id. at 67 para. 131.
42. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 26.
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food and water, and social security.44 Apart from education, the format of
the rights is similar, so in the case of housing the right provides:
“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. (2) The
state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.”45
In including such rights within the Bill of Rights, South Africa went
beyond the conventional terrain of a Bill of Rights in commonwealth
countries. Most domestic rights instruments protect civil and political
rights, such as the right to freedom of expression and association. Far fewer
protect social and economic rights directly. However, a distinction between
civil and political rights, on the one hand, and social and economic rights,
on the other, was not followed when the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in
1948.
Indeed, in a recent fascinating book,46 Cass Sunstein has suggested that a
key reason for the inclusion of both civil and political rights, as well as
social and economic rights, was Franklin D. Roosevelt’s insistence that the
two were interrelated. FDR famously identified four essential human
freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom to worship God in one’s own way,
freedom from want, and freedom from fear.47 This led him to draft what he
called “the second Bill of Rights,” which contained social and economic
rights.48
As a matter of normative desirability too, there is no difference between
social and economic rights and civil and political rights. The desirability of
ensuring that all citizens receive basic education, are properly housed, have
access to food, clean water, and healthcare is not, I think, a controversial
one. Indeed, social and economic rights are in some sense anterior to civil
and political rights. The basic needs of human beings for shelter, nutrition,
and clothing must be met before a lively interest in freedom of expression
and association arises. It is for this reason that many international
documents acknowledge the indivisibility and interdependence of social
and economic rights, on the one hand, and civil and political rights on the
other.
In the South African context, however, the inclusion and protection of
social and economic rights in the Constitution had great significance. The
real effect of centuries of colonialism, followed by decades of apartheid has
been the impoverishment of black South Africans and the correlative
enrichment of white South Africans. Our society is one of the most unequal

43. Id. § 29.
44. Id. § 27.
45. Id. § 26.
46. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004).
47. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address of the President of the United States to
Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 87 CONG. REC. 44, 46–47 (1941).
48. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 61–95.
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in the world, and one in which the colour of one’s skin remains a strong
predictor of socioeconomic status. Unless the basic needs of food, housing,
and education are met, civil and political rights may seem mere luxuries.
This might have carried the message that the Constitution contained a
charter for whites and the wealthy while remaining oblivious to the needs of
black South Africans who had been historically dispossessed and excluded.
The real challenge in entrenching social and economic rights is to
determine the scope of their justiciability. There is a widespread view
amongst politicians and lawyers that civil and political rights, on the one
hand, and social and economic rights, on the other, are in some significant
way conceptually different. Social and economic rights have been labelled
“second generation” rights, while civil and political rights are considered
“first generation.” (I might point out that this categorisation seems to me to
be back-to-front—if food, water, and housing are indeed anterior as a
matter of lived experience to civil and political rights, should they not be
the first?)
The challenge is a complex one. Both civil and political rights, and
social and economic rights may impose an obligation upon the government
that is essentially negative in character. Do not limit my right to free
speech. Do not evict me from my home. Enforcement of the negative
obligations that rights impose is rarely controversial or difficult, whether
the right concerned is the right of freedom of expression or the right of
access to housing.
The justiciability of both, however, becomes more difficult when one has
to consider whether the right not only imposes a negative obligation, but
also a positive one. Does the state have a duty to make it possible for
people to exercise their right of freedom of expression? Does the state have
a duty to provide everyone with a house? Our intuitive anxiety about the
justiciability of social and economic rights largely arises from our
assumption that they primarily impose positive obligations upon
government. And it is not different from the difficult questions that arise in
the context of positive obligations that arise in respect of civil and political
rights, whether it is the right to vote or the right to reasonable
accommodation in disability law.
The South African Constitution helps to answer this question in relation
to most of the social and economic rights by delineating quite carefully the
extent of the positive obligation upon the state. So section 26(2) of the
Constitution states: “The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive
realisation of the right.”49 I probably don’t need to highlight the word
“reasonable” in the section to you. It is indeed the key to the Court’s
approach to the justiciability of social and economic rights.

49. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 26(2).
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In the Nevirapine case,50 in which the government proposed to establish
only two sites per province for Nevirapine to be provided to HIV positive
pregnant mothers, the question was whether that constituted a reasonable
measure to achieve the right of access to health care.51 Given that the
manufacturers of the medication were furnishing it to the government for
free, and given that it was clear that the government had the capacity to
establish testing and counselling centres in excess of two per province, and
given the World Health Organization’s assessment of the value of
Nevirapine in reducing mother to child transmission of HIV, the Court held
that the government’s plan was not reasonable.52 The order the Court made
was:
It is declared that:
(a) Sections 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution require the government
to devise and implement within its available resources a
comprehensive and co-ordinated programme to realise progressively
the rights of pregnant women and their newborn children to have
access to health services to combat mother-to-child transmission of
HIV.
(b) The programme to be realised progressively within available
resources must include reasonable measures for counselling and
testing pregnant women for HIV, counselling HIV-positive pregnant
women on the options open to them to reduce the risk of mother-tochild transmission of HIV, and making appropriate treatment
available to them . . . .53

The Court went on to declare that the current policy fell short of
compliance with this declaratory order and the government was ordered,
“without delay to: Remove the restrictions that prevent Nevirapine from
being made available for the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-child
transmission of HIV at public hospitals and clinics that are not research and
training sites.”54 Finally, the Court ruled: “The orders made [above] do not
preclude government from adapting its policy in a manner consistent with
the Constitution if equally appropriate or better methods become available
to it for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.”55
The approach of the Court to social and economic rights, as the text of
the Constitution requires and consistent with its approach to its relationship
with the legislature and executive in other areas, is to consider whether the
measures established by government in any respect of a particular right, or
aspect of it, are reasonable. In considering what will be reasonable, the
Court said in an early case:

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (1) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
Id. at 764–65 para. 135.
Id. at 754 para. 95.
Id. at 764–65 para. 135.
Id. at 765 para. 135.
Id.

2012]

A PILLAR OF DEMOCRACY

1185

Reasonableness must also be understood in the context of the Bill of
Rights as a whole. The right of access to adequate housing is entrenched
because we value human beings and want to ensure that they are afforded
their basic human needs. A society must seek to ensure that the basic
necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be a society based on
human dignity, freedom and equality. To be reasonable, measures cannot
leave out of account the degree and extent of the denial of the right they
endeavour to realise. Those whose needs are most urgent and whose
ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by
the measures aimed at achieving the realisation of the right.56

The protection of social and economic rights does not mean that every
individual can come to court and demand a house. The Constitution
requires only that government take reasonable steps progressively and
within available resources to afford citizens access to housing. The court is
thus serving as a public forum where government is called upon to explain
its policies. This form of justiciability is as much about facilitating
participative and responsive democracy, as it is about social and economic
rights.
What is increasingly clear, however, is that the negative aspects of social
and economic rights will provide real shields for citizens to protect them
against the withdrawal of their access to health care, housing, and
education. So, in one case, for example, the court held that the rules for the
sale in execution of houses needed to be reconceived to ensure that a court,
in ordering execution against immovable property, would take into account
the right of access to housing and not make an order which would result in a
person being rendered homeless, which would be disproportionate.57 The
Court reasoned that there would be circumstances in which it would be
disproportionate or unjustifiable to permit execution against a home. Such
was the case before the court, in which one of the applicants had purchased
vegetables in an amount of approximately R190 (less than £13) and, as a
result of the failure to pay that debt and an absence of any movable property
to satisfy the judgment, was at risk of her home being sold in execution of
the debt. The other applicant had borrowed R250 (less than £15) and faced
the same result. The Court stated:
[I]t is clear that there will be circumstances in which it will be
unjustifiable to allow execution . . . . There will be many instances where
execution will be unjustifiable because the advantage that attaches to a
creditor who seeks execution will be far outweighed by the immense
prejudice and hardship caused to the debtor.58

56. Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 69 para. 44.
57. See Jaftha v. Schoeman, Van Rooyen v. Stoltz 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) at 155–56
paras. 31–34; see also Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217
(CC) at 225–29 paras. 14–23.
58. Jaftha, at 158–59 para. 43.
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CONCLUSION
It is perhaps surprising given our history that courts should have been
given such an important role in our new constitutional democracy. But I
hope that I have illustrated tonight, neither tendentiously, nor in a manner
insensitive to my own judicial role, that the role of courts under the South
African Constitution is twofold. The first is to protect the fundamental
rights of South African citizens—not only civil and political rights, but also
social and democratic rights. The second is to foster a process of public
reason in our democracy by allowing citizens, through the process of
litigation, to ask government for their reasons for the exercise of public
power, which reasons are then scrutinised by the courts with careful
attention to the need to protect the legitimate constitutional role of the
legislature and executive. The important constitutional role entrusted to the
courts should enhance the possibility of participatory and responsive
government and also continue to facilitate the transformation of our broader
society. I would like to end, perhaps surprisingly, with the words of FDR in
his famous four freedoms speech to which I have already referred and
which I think sums up the ongoing challenge of change in the South African
Constitution: “Since the beginning of our . . . history,” he said, “we have
been engaged in change—in a perpetual peaceful revolution—a revolution
which goes on steadily, quietly adjusting itself to changing conditions—
without the concentration camp or the quicklime in the ditch.”59

59. Roosevelt, supra note 47, at 47.

